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Abstract
We study inter¯rm price competition in the presence of horizontal and vertical in-
tra¯rm con°icts in each ¯rm. Intra¯rm con°icts are captured by a principal-agent
framework with ¯rms employing more than one agent and implementing a tour-
nament incentive scheme. The principals o®er premium incentives in the sense of
revenue shares to which agents react by proposing a sales price. Introducing such
intra¯rm con°icts results in higher prices and lower e®ort levels. Increasing the
number of agents lowers the optimal surplus share of the agents as well as the in-
dividual e®ort and the sales prices. Firm pro¯ts ¯rst increase and then decrease
when employing more and more agents suggesting that principals should employ an
intermediate number of agents.
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Whereas principal-agent theory typically restricts itself to the analysis of intra¯rm
con°icts by neglecting inter¯rm competition, most of the theoretical IO literature
focusses purely on inter¯rm competition by assuming a unitary ¯rm decision maker.
While studying only one of these two basic con°icting lines, intra¯rm or inter¯rm
con°icts, will certainly be enlightening for the analysis of many questions, in some
cases it may suggest questionable implications concerning real-world behavior where
both con°icting lines usually coexist. For instance, neglecting inter¯rm competition
in a simple principal-agent framework (the LEN-model, see e.g. Spreemann 1987
and Hart, HolmstrÄ om 1987) will typically suggest a generally positive relationship
between CEO-earnings and ¯rm performance. In the real world, however, inter¯rm
competition on the markets for top managers may lead to a situation where a low-
performing ¯rm has to pay a lot in order to recruit a high-level CEO with the
potential to help the ¯rm out of its crisis. Moreover, a generally positive relationship
between ¯rm performance and CEO pay is also questioned by empirical studies
(see, e.g. Jensen, Murphy 1990). Similarly, assuming a unitary decision maker in
IO models of inter¯rm competition may miss the decisive reason why ¯rms abstain
from pro¯t maximization.
Of course, one may assume that principals are the only ones who are concerned
about both, intra¯rm and inter¯rm con°icts. If principals, for instance, confront
their agents with piece rates, all what their agents will have to do is to match
their e®orts with the given piece rates, i.e., there is neither a con°ict between the
agents in a single ¯rm nor between those working in di®erent ¯rms. In our paper,
we do not only burden the principals with the coexistence of intra¯rm con°icts and
inter¯rm competition, but also the agents. In our analysis, principals ¯rst determine
the incentive schemes for their agents who then determine their ¯rm's sales policy.
Hence, there is strategic interaction within and between ¯rms also on the second
stage. Thus principals, when determining the incentive schemes, must be aware of
the fact that their agents are competing with fellow agents as well as with colleagues
in competing ¯rms.
Our analysis is related to the studies of Vickers (1985), Fershtman, Judd (1987) as
well as Sklivas (1987) who discuss the optimal intra¯rm incentives for managers in
a situation of inter¯rm quantity or price competition respectively. KrÄ akel (2005)
further regards tournament-like inter¯rm competition in a principal- (one) agent
framework. To the best of our knowledge, however, only GÄ uth, Pull, Stadler (2010)
avoid the restriction to one principal and one agent in each ¯rm. Whereas GÄ uth,
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Pull, Stadler (2010) analyze a homogeneous oligopoly market with quantity competi-
tion, we are concerned with a heterogeneous duopoly market with price competition.
In our view, quantity competition can either be justi¯ed by special institutional ar-
rangements like commodity exchanges or be interpreted as a shortcut of analyzing
more complex market decision processes involving capacities, e.g. in the sense of
Kreps, Scheinkman (1983), or as an approximation of price competition of heteroge-
neous markets. In the latter sense the present study explores the "continuity"when
modeling and analyzing intra- and inter¯rm con°icts either by quantity or price
competition on more or less heterogeneous markets.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the bench-
mark case without intra¯rm con°ict. Section 3 adds intra¯rm con°icts to study the
combined e®ects of inter¯rm competition and intra¯rm con°icts. Section 4 concludes
and compares our results with the related literature.
2 The Benchmark Case: Price Competition in
Duopoly
We restrict ourselves to the case of two competing ¯rms i = 1;2 in a heterogeneous
market with ¯rm speci¯c sales amounting to qi =
P
k ei;k; i = 1;2; k = 1;:::;n;
where ei;k denotes the e®ort level of worker k employed in ¯rm i. Sales are assumed
to serve demand for the di®erentiated products. To make the model analytically
tractable, we further assume linear demand functions of the form
qi(p1;p2) = 1 ¡ 2pi + pj i = 1;2; i 6= j
for the two substitute goods. E®ort costs are private costs of each agent, but com-





To provide a benchmark solution without intra¯rm con°ict, we ¯rst assume that
both ¯rms maximize their ¯rm surplus, i.e. we assume a unitary decision maker
for each ¯rm who could dictate e®ort levels and possibly compensate the ¯rm's n
workers for their e®ort costs by ¯xed wages. Due to the strictly convex cost function
each ¯rm will do so by imposing the same e®ort level ei for all its n workers. Thus
the surplus of each ¯rm can be expressed by
Si(pi;pj) = pi(1 ¡ 2pi + pj) ¡ (1 ¡ 2pi + pj)
2=(2n); i = 1;2; i 6= j:
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From the ¯rst-order conditions the equilibrium benchmark solution without intra¯rm









(3n + 2)2 :
Some numerical calculations are summarized in Table 1. All outcome variables react
monotonically to an increasing number n of employees in each ¯rm. Prices decrease,
individual e®orts converge to 0, and the sales amounts and surplus levels increase.
n 1 2 3 ... 100 ... n ! 1
p¤ 0.600 0.500 0.455 ... 0.338 ... 0.333
q¤ 0.400 0.500 0.555 ... 0.662 ... 0.667
e¤ 0.400 0.250 0.185 ... 0.007 ... 0.000
S¤ 0.160 0.188 0.198 ... 0.221 ... 0.222
Table 1: Results in the case of only inter¯rm competition.
3 Introducing Intra¯rm Con°icts
Rather than assuming that all members (principal and agents) of each ¯rm i are
interested in maximizing ¯rm surplus, we now include vertical and horizontal in-
tra¯rm con°icts and hence analyze both, strategic interactions within ¯rms as well
as between ¯rms. In order to demonstrate the combined e®ects of intra¯rm and
inter¯rm competition, we assume that principals share revenues with their agents.
Let si denote the revenue share for the whole labor force of a ¯rm. Thus each of the
agents, k = 1;:::;n; employed by ¯rm i = 1;2 earns
Ui;k(pi;k) = sipi;kqi(pi;k;pj;`)=n ¡ qi(pi;k;pj;`)
2=(2n
2)
= sipi;k(1 ¡ 2pi;k + pj;`)=n ¡ (1 ¡ 2pi;k + pj;`)
2=(2n
2);
where pi;k (pj;`) is the price suggestion made by agent k(`) in ¯rm i (j). While it may
appear unusual that agents choose prices, this corresponds to the usual assumption
in the case of quantity competition where agents via their e®ort choices determine
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their ¯rm's sales quantity and hence their ¯rms' market policy.1 In principle, in case
of n > 1, di®erent agents k = 1;:::;n in ¯rm i could propose di®erent prices pi;k.
Due to their symmetry, however, this does not occur in case of general optimality
on which our analysis is based. O® the equilibrium play one could impose that pi
is given by the minimal price pi;k, i.e. the most aggressive price proposal or by the
maximal pi;k yielding the smallest e®ort level.
Maximization of Ui;k with respect to the price pi;k and solving for the equilibrium
price choices yields
pi =
12 + 6nsi + 10nsj + 5n2sisj
12 + 14nsi + 14nsj + 15n2sisj
; i = 1;2; i 6= j;
for all agents in the second stage as functions of the incentive constellation (si;sj),
chosen by the two principals on the ¯rst stage. Anticipating the equilibrium e®ort,
the pro¯t functions of the two principals are given by
¼i(s1;s2) = (1 ¡ si)piqi
= N=(12 + 14nsi + 14nsj + 15n
2sisj)
2; i = 1;2; i 6= j;















The ¯rst-order condition for maximizing ¼i(s1;s2) with respect to si; i = 1;2, and
the obvious symmetry of the solution imply a polynomial equation for each number




12 + 16ns¤ + 5n2s¤2
12 + 28ns¤ + 15n2s¤2;




12 + 28ns¤ + 15n2s¤2;




12 + 28ns¤ + 15n2s¤2:
1If we think of agents as being high-level managers the assumption that they determine prices
is of course rather intuitive and natural.
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Finally, ¯rm pro¯ts are given by
¼




Table 2 illustrates how the solution (s¤¤;e¤¤;p¤¤;q¤¤;¼¤¤) depends on the number
n = 1;2;::: of agents employed by each duopoly seller. Interestingly, the variables
in the upper four rows of Table 2 react monotonically to a rise in n with s¤¤;p¤¤;q¤¤
and e¤¤ increasing in n whereas ¼¤¤ depends on n in a hump-shaped fashion with
¼¤¤ ¯rst increasing and then decreasing in the number of agents.
n 1 2 3 ... 100 ... n ! 1
s¤¤ 0.363 0.363 0.259 ... 0.040 ... 0.000
p¤¤ 0.765 0.652 0.641 ... 0.429 ... 0.333
q¤¤ 0.235 0.348 0.359 ... 0.571 ... 0.667
e¤¤ 0.235 0.174 0.120 ... 0.006 ... 0.000
¼¤¤ 0.115 0.145 0.171 ... 0.235 ... 0.222
Table 2: Solution results with intra¯rm and inter¯rm competition.
A comparison of the results with those of the benchmark case shows that the inclu-
sion of intra¯rm con°icts results in higher prices and lower e®ort levels. Whereas
the popular single decision maker framework, based on ¯rm speci¯c surplus maxi-
mization, suggests to employ more and more workers in order to lower the marginal
costs of e®ort, additionally capturing intra¯rm con°icts ¯rst also encourages such at-
tempts but then induces principals to limit their labor force. Thus, even in the case
of huge labor supply, principals would refrain from hiring all workers what provides
a novel justi¯cation of natural unemployment, namely one based on the coexistence
of intra- and inter¯rm con°icts for heterogenous oligopoly markets.
4 Conclusion
Why did we care to extend our analysis for homogeneous markets with sales com-
petition to heterogeneous markets with price competition? Except for special in-
stitutions like commodity exchanges, homogeneous markets with sales competition
are at best a border case of heterogeneous markets with price competition. One
may even argue that such markets should not be considered directly but rather via
studying heterogeneous markets with price competition and taking the limit when
heterogeneity vanishes (see Brennen, GÄ uth, Kliemt 2008 for a general discussion
of such an approximative truth principle). In many markets, at least restricted
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price choices by agents are usual. The argument that modeling price competition
by agents is rather unusual in agency theory does not question our study but the
continuity between the analysis of homogeneous and heterogeneous markets. What
seems so obvious for the homogeneous market should be even more reasonable for
the heterogeneous market. Either agents can in°uence their ¯rm's sales strategy,
regardless of whether the market is homogeneous or heterogeneous, or not.
Here, as in our earlier study, we have assumed the former and as a matter of fact
performed a complementary analysis of intra- and inter¯rm con°icts for heteroge-
neous markets. If this appears to be a somewhat strange exercise, one must ask: do
we want to deny that agents can in°uence their ¯rm's sales strategy? If not, the
next question would be: are there more adequate models for capturing intra¯rm and
inter¯rm con°icts on heterogeneous markets with price competition?
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